COMMENT BY SAMUEL A. STOUFFERt
The authors of this searching and lucid discussion of opinion research have
asked me for some comments. The generosity with which they have treated my
book would be ill repaid if I quibbled over details. There is, however, one important point upon which I feel moved to comment, not because the authors and I
disagree, but because I want to be sure that its implications are not overlooked.
The point concerns a query which lawyers, in particular, like to make: If the
meaning of each given question is ambiguous or otherwise subject to error, is
not the entire research based on such questions meaningless?
The answer is: Perhaps such research is meaningless and perhaps not. But
the important point is that we have methods of testing whether or not use of
such questions is meaningful.
One such method is the use of a scale. If people who say, "All Communists
should be put in jail," all mean the same thing by their answers there is no
problem. But the word Communists will mean different things to different
people. If it were extremely ambiguous, then we would find large inconsistencies
in the relationship between answers to this item and answers to other items such
as: "If a person wanted to make a speech in your community favoring government ownership of the railroads and big industries, should he be allowed to
speak or not?" If we look at a cluster of such items we may find by the technical
procedures of scaling that there is no pattern of consistency between answers to
the jail question and the others. Then we would know that the jail question,
either because of ambiguity or because of some other idiosyncracy of meaning,
is not helpful in rank-ordering people along a single dimension of permissiveness
toward non-conformists. Actually, the jail question passed the test of internal
consistency in the study being reviewed. This still does not mean that the
answers should now be interpreted literally in terms of jailing Communists, but
rather that the answers are meaningfully relevant to the problems of ranking
people according to their degree of permissiveness.
Furthermore, it should be noted that appropriate scaling procedures should
quickly discover whether respondents too frequently were careless in their
answers or so indifferent that they answered more or less at random. Indeed,
scaling even can serve to some extent (though not infallibly) to uncover lying,
because it is hard for individuals to lie with the kind of internal consistency
required to produce a good scale.
Finally, a good scale is a more reliable measure than any of the individual
items that compose it, just as an average, in general, is a more reliable measure
than the individual errorful measures which are added up to compute it.
t Director of the Laboratory of Social Relations, Harvard University.
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It is quite possible that training in simple measurement theory may some day
be as important in legal training as is elementary exposure to the theory of cost
accounting. I am not a lawyer, but I find that the sharply disciplined minds of
some of my lawyer friends grasp the essential logic of such problems more
quickly and easier than do a few of my less rigorous colleagues with training in
psychology or the social sciences.

COMMENT BY PAUL F. LAZARSFELDt
The social scientist needs very badly at this moment careful analyses of
major research endeavors. The two authors have rendered a real service, not
only to the lay public and advanced student, but to the research fraternity
itself, which needs continuous self-awareness of its procedures. While one cannot but agree with most everything the authors say, there are two points which
deserve special attention, and a few words of elaboration.
A survey like Stouffer's should, in part, be looked upon as a piece of contemporary history. Undoubtedly, there will one day be a great deal of writing
on the atmosphere of freedom in the mid-twentieth century, just as there has
been much on the medieval mind or on the spirit of the Renaissance. The historian of the future, however, will have survey data at his disposal. Although
such data, being relatively precise, invites more immediate generalization and
interpretation, it is not different from other historical data. If Lord Acton asserts that power corrupts, the only way to prove it is to look at many instances
where people came to power and to see what it did to them, under what circumstances it corrupted them and so forth. We would most likely find that
power doesn't always corrupt, and that very often when it appears to do so the
relationship is actually the reverse. Corrupt people are sometimes more likely
to get to power. In a way, we have the same situation when Stouffer finds a
correlation between perception of the Communist danger and permissiveness.1
Under other circumstances and in other historical situations such a correlation
might not exist. For instance, the extent to which people are aware of the danger
of atomic warfare probably has very low correlation with the extent to which
they engage in war-preventing activities; or if an economic depression or some
other major issue were to capture national attention, even in regard to Communism, the correlation which Stouffer found might be much lower. Within his
own data one could draw interesting inferences as to the variation of the findings. Groups for which the correlation is relatively low either might not believe
t Chairman, Department of Sociology, Columbia University.
1Incidentally, I completely agree with the use of the term "permissiveness" instead of

"tolerance." As a matter of fact, that term is being used by a Columbia University group in a
survey on academic freedom.

